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Policymakers devote a good deal of attention to the problem of underemployment and
rightly so.1 Yet a regret expressed by many individuals in the last 12 weeks of their lives
is that they spent too much time at work (Ware, 2012). Concerns about working too much
are expressed not only retrospectively, as regrets, but also at the time, by those who
actively participate in the labour market. In the UK, over 30 per cent of individuals
employed in the labour market want to work fewer hours (UK Office for National
Statistics, 2019). And of these, about a third want this even if it means lower pay. This
phenomenon is called overemployment and it occurs whenever an individual would like
to work fewer hours, even if this results in reduced income.
Such complaints about excessively long working time raise an important question: To
what extent, if at all, should a just society adopt public policies that regulate and limit the
amount of time people work? Any attempt to answer this question will face the following
dilemma. On the one hand, we can adopt a laissez-faire view, according to which
governments must refrain from imposing working time policies on the labour market.
But this view generates a situation in which, as just noted, many citizens experience deep
regret about the balance between work and leisure in their lives. On the other hand, we
can endorse an interventionist view that advocates government imposition of working
time policies. However, such a view appears to be objectionably perfectionist insofar as
it imposes on citizens a particular conception of the ideal balance between work and
leisure, and labour market policies are unlikely to elicit stable endorsement over time if
they rely on controversial perfectionist claims of this kind. To illustrate, some Marxist
scholars defend working time reductions on the grounds that freedom from work is
necessary for human flourishing (Weeks, 2011). Yet citizens will reasonably disagree
over the question of how much free time is necessary for a good life. Some citizens
attribute more value to work and less to free time, than others. In agreement with
political liberalism, I believe an interventionist view that prohibits them from working
for the amount that they want on the basis of a perfectionist account of human flourishing
cannot reasonably be imposed on them (Arneson, 1990).
My aim in this article is to propose a way out of this dilemma. I shall do this by
showing that the interventionist view can be defended on anti-perfectionist grounds. My
argument rests on the observation that a significant amount of overemployment in
society arises from a dynamic that I will call the working time rat race. What drives
this dynamic is the fact that employers routinely use ‘time spent at work’ as a proxy for
their employees’ productivity and commitment (Landers et al., 1996). Workers who
spend a particularly long time at the workplace are often rewarded with promotions,
raises, bonuses, or are saved from dismissals and budget cuts. This creates an incentive
for workers to demonstrate their willingness to work longer hours than their colleagues
since this increases their likelihood of attaining benefits and avoiding burdens. However,
as more workers work longer hours in order to demonstrate their productivity and
commitment, this strategy loses its effectiveness. If everyone increases their working
time, no one will be ahead of the others in the race for promotion but everyone will work
more. The working time rat race is, in other words, a collective action problem where (i)
it is individually rational for each worker to spend more hours at work than her com-
petitors and (ii) because of this, the outcome is a situation that is worse for most of those
who compete in this way.2
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My justification for the interventionist view is that it helps workers overcome the rat
race or at least redress its effects. This ‘rat race’ justification is significant because it
manages to justify working time policies without appealing to perfectionist views about
the ideal balance between leisure and work that makes for a ‘good life’.3 Labour market
policies that remove or mitigate the rat race can take a number of different forms. For
example, states can directly limit the time that workers are allowed to work by passing
maximum work hours legislation. Alternatively, states can promote labour unions, which
enable workers to coordinate and collectively bargain for working time regulation.
Another way of addressing the working time rat race may be to introduce a basic income
that provides workers with a safety net, and thus an exit option from workplaces plagued
by the rat race. There is an important question as to which type of policy is best suited to
tackle the rat race. However, I will not argue for any particular policy but instead show
why the harmful effects of the rat race justify some sort of working time reduction policy.
The article is structured as follows. The second section describes the working time rat
race and the problem of overemployment in more detail. The third section explains why
the rat race sometimes gives rise to a complaint on the side of workers who are nega-
tively affected by it. Finally, fourth, fifth and sixth sections answer objections to labour
market policies that remove the rat race.
Before I begin, let me issue two important qualifications. First, my arguments focus
exclusively on the rat race between workers as an objection against long working time,
and therefore I set aside other reasons for objecting to long work hours, such as workers’
health or gender equality.4 I do not deny that these other reasons may exist and I see the
arguments developed in this article as consistent with them. Thus, my aim is to highlight
an additional reason to regulate working time whose force has not been fully appreciated
by defenders of working time policies. Second, I don’t commit to the claim that all
working time rat races call for state intervention. Sometimes, rat race-removing inter-
ventions are morally impermissible because they worsen the situation of the least advan-
taged. Importantly, there are working time rat races that occur between privileged
workers who possess scarce talents that allow them to extract very high wages. If states
help these workers overcome their collective action problem so that they end up working
significantly less, then there is less income upon which states can levy taxes that serve to
redistribute wealth to the least advantaged. In other words, regulating rat races that occur
between very privileged workers can be harmful to the least advantaged. The ‘Regula-
tion is harmful to third parties’ section elaborates on this.
Overemployment and the rat race
Mismatches between preferred work hours and hours actually worked are widespread,
and a number of studies show that overemployment is pervasive in industrialized coun-
tries (Jacobs and Gerson, 2004; Martinez-Granado, 2005; Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds and
Aletraris, 2006). A survey conducted for the European Commission reports that 38 per
cent of employees in 12 European countries would like to reduce their work hours (Evans
et al., 2001).
One natural explanation for this has to do with transaction costs. Employers prefer to
hire a smaller number of workers who work long hours than to hire a larger number of
Jauch 295
workers who work short hours. This is because employers incur transaction costs when
they advertise jobs, select and contract workers, supervise and train workers, coordinate
tasks between workers, provide office equipment and pay payroll taxes and social
security costs. The existence of these costs makes it attractive for employers to hire
fewer workers who each work longer hours because each additional worker adds a fixed
amount of these transaction costs.
However, the ‘transaction cost’ explanation for overemployment is not completely
satisfactory. It cannot account for all overemployment because, at least in some cases,
employers could pass transaction costs on to those who prefer to work fewer hours by
offering them lower hourly wages. According to neoclassical economic theory, workers
who prefer working less at lower hourly pay would still supply their labour at that lower
pay in ways that compensate for the higher transaction costs of part-time work
arrangements.5
There is a further and more convincing explanation for overemployment that refers to
a collective action problem between workers. Workers have incentives to pursue a ‘long
work hours strategy’, although most workers would be better off if no one pursued this
strategy. The dynamic of this collective action problem runs as follows. Employers have
to make decisions about hiring, promoting and firing employees. One of the most
important criteria for deciding which person gets hired, promoted or fired is the respec-
tive worker’s productivity and commitment. Being complex and multifaceted concepts,
productivity and commitment are very difficult to measure. Employers therefore regu-
larly resort to approximating workers’ productivity and commitment by using their
working time as a proxy. Those who work long hours are regarded as especially pro-
ductive and committed. Workers are aware of this practice and often compete with each
other in order to display their willingness to work long hours so as to increase their
chances of getting hired or promoted. Landers et al. (1996: 70) find evidence for this
mechanism and describe it as follows:
Performing extra work, beyond the norm of a job, workplace or occupation, may be a way
for a worker to transmit a signal of promotability or value to employers. [ . . . ] The pursuit of
long-term relative status through increasing their own work hours promotes a “rat race” with
all workers working longer average hours.
Rat races of this type may occur not only between employed workers but also between
those who seek employment. Job applicants sometimes demonstrate motivation and
enthusiasm to their prospective employers by offering to sign contracts that specify
particularly long hours.
One obvious drawback of showing commitment through long working time is that, if
pursued by many, this strategy loses effectiveness. Think of the familiar case of a crowd
in a concert, where everyone stands on their toes in order to improve their sight of the
stage. Here, the individually rational thing to do for each person ceases to yield benefits
if it is done by everyone. These situations are referred to as collective action problems
and they occur when disincentives make it difficult for a group of individuals to pursue a
mutually beneficial goal. Most individuals would be better off if everyone pursued a
common strategy of cooperation, but each individual has an incentive to defect.
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It bears emphasizing that the working time rat race is not limited to situations where
workers seek advantages such as employment, promotions or bonuses. It also occurs
when workers attempt to avoid disadvantages such as downgrading and dismissals.
If a worker believes their employer uses input time as a screen before an anticipated
downsizing or reorganization, they may view longer hours as a protective device or
immunization against the risk of future job loss, income loss or demotion. (Landers
et al., 1996: 70)
Furthermore, workers sometimes increase their working time because of the sheer
fact that working exceptionally long hours earns that person reputation and esteem. In
Western countries, ‘being busy’ and having little free time has become an indicator of a
particular social status that many strive to achieve (Burke, 2008). On average, individ-
uals with more education and with higher paid jobs have less free time, and ‘being busy’
is often associated with being important or sought after (Hamermesh, 2018). This can
make it attractive for anyone to emulate time-pressured lifestyles in order to gain the
prestige associated with these lifestyles. This too is an instance of a collective action
problem because no one will increase their relative social standing if everyone pursues
the long work hours strategy.
Lastly, working time can be driven up by a desire to protect or enhance one’s social
standing by purchasing status goods. This kind of competitive consumption occurs when
individuals buy products whose possession grants them social prestige and sets them
apart from their peers (Frank, 2010; Hirsch, 1995; Schor, 1993, 1999). For those who
rely on paid employment as a source of income, competitive spending often requires
increased working time. However, the relative social standing of those who engage in
competitive consumption does not improve if this strategy is pursued by a large number
of others who do the same. Keeping up with the Joneses gets harder if the Joneses are
keeping up with the Smiths (compare Arnold, 2020)! Competitive consumption is a
different manifestation of the working time rat race where the collective action problem
is initiated by a desire to set oneself apart through purchasing goods that enhance one’s
positional standing.
In short, the rat race occurs in different contexts and is triggered by different motiva-
tions. What’s more, workers can increase their working time in ways other than working
extra hours or agreeing to contracts that specify long hours. One especially concerning
form of increased working time is competitive presenteeism. This term is used to
describe situations where workers demonstrate commitment by coming to work in spite
of ill health (Quazi, 2013). If one or several workers decide to come to work despite
being ill, they can set a precedent and an expectation with regard to what can be reason-
ably expected from workers when they are ill. A related phenomenon involves workers
who take very short periods of maternity leave. A prominent example for this is the case
of former French Minister of Justice, Rachida Dati, who resumed work after 5 days of
maternity leave. Some commentators argued that this was possibly motivated by a
concern of no longer being taken seriously by members of the Sarkozy administration
after a longer maternity leave (Perkins, 2009).
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In summary, the working time rat race is a collective action problem that occurs in
several different contexts and that leaves most workers worse off if a large number of
them engage in it. Let me conclude this section by formalizing this result. Consider first a
simple case:
Promotion: Two workers with preferences for lots of leisure are equally qualified and
do the same kinds of tasks. Both want to be promoted. Their boss wants to promote
the more productive employee based on whoever displays higher commitment.
When leaving the firm each day, she observes which worker’s office light is still
switched on. Both workers are aware of this and thus face a decision between
leaving work on time or staying longer in order to increase their chances of getting
promoted.
The different outcomes of this decision situation can be presented in the following
payoff matrix:
This decision situation resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma in that it is individually
rational for each worker to pursue the ‘dominant strategy’ of working extra hours,
although both are worse off if this strategy is pursued by both. When they are unable
to coordinate their actions, the workers converge on the equilibrium outcome in the
bottom right box where both work overtime. Next, I will explain why this gives rise
to a complaint on behalf of those affected by the rat race.6
The complaint against the rat race
Note that both workers in the above example would prefer to leave on time and that
neither of them is more likely to achieve the promotion if they both work overtime. In
other words, a Pareto-improving shift (from the bottom right to the top left corner of the
matrix) is possible but, in the absence of a coordinating mechanism, the workers cannot
make that shift. Assume now that an outside agent, say the state, could enact a policy that
helps the workers coordinate their conduct in order to realize the Pareto-improving shift.
Assume moreover that the state refuses to enact this policy and fails to provide good
reasons for its refusal. In this case, it would seem reasonable for the workers to mount a
complaint against the state. Its refusal to act leaves them worse off than they could
otherwise be for no good reason. To clarify the nature of their complaint, consider the
following example:
Worker A
Leave on time Extra hours
Worker B Leave on time 0/0 2/1
Extra hours 1/2 1/1
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Two villages: Two villages are close to each other but separated by a river. Residents
of both villages have an interest in meeting each other, but the absence of a bridge
makes it difficult and costly for them to do so. To see each other, the villagers must
cross the river in boats.
Let’s assume that each villager on either side of the river has an interest in building a
bridge because the per capita cost of using boats is much greater than the per capita cost
of constructing a bridge. However, there is a difficulty in that the villagers find it hard to
trust each other. Each individual has an incentive to freeride on the efforts others make in
order to build the bridge by not contributing to the project of its construction. Assume
again that the state could intervene to solve this collective action problem, say by raising
the necessary funds through taxing the villagers, but suppose it refuses to do so for no
good reason. Intuitively, this gives rise to a complaint on the part of the villagers.
Collective action problems similar to this occur frequently in the real world and, in
some cases, they have led states to intervene. One example of this is the educational arms
race. Sometimes parents seek to enhance their children’s competitiveness by providing
them with private lessons or sending them to expensive private schools with the aim of
increasing their children’s future opportunities, such as the likelihood of being admitted
to a prestigious college or finding high-earning employment. However, given that the
number of such desirable positions is limited, children will benefit in the competition for
these positions only from comparative advantages and not from absolute standards of
education. This can lead to an educational arms race, where parents have incentives to
invest into ever more strategies that will confer advantages on their children. But these
strategies can lose their effectiveness when similar strategies are pursued by a large
number of other parents.7
Arguably, the situation of the parents in this case is analogous to that of workers in the
labour market who work longer than they would like. They are made worse off than they
might have been in that they are unable to coordinate their conduct and possess a
complaint against governments that do not assist them in overcoming this obstacle by,
say, introducing legislation whose purpose is to prevent the collective action problem
from arising or to redress its effects.
Consider now an objection to this claim which holds that the harmful effects of
collective action problems like this are not enough to justify coercive state intervention.
In other words, the benefits of regulating a collective action problem cannot justify the
costs associated with intrusive regulation. To illustrate this, imagine the following
scenario:
Buying a television: A group of consumers is interested in buying a new television. A
retailer offers a television at a price of £500, but each consumer would prefer to
spend only £490 on this product. If the consumers could coordinate their actions
and collectively bargain with the retailer, they would be able to drive down the
price to £490.
Imagine now that a state reacts to this situation by employing public officials whose
job is to coordinate consumers into large consumer groups who then use their collective
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bargaining power to achieve lower prices. Imagine furthermore that organizing consu-
mers into groups and coordinating their interests is a laborious process that involves
significant administrative costs. It is less straightforwardly clear that this intervention is
justifiable because it involves a large effort in order to provide a relatively trivial benefit.
There is however an important disanalogy between Promotion and Buying a televi-
sion. The interest at stake for consumers in Buying a television is relatively small. They
face a one-time loss of £10 if they are unable to coordinate their conduct. The workers in
Promotion, by contrast, spend significantly more time at the workplace as a result of the
working time rat race. This is the time they could otherwise spend on activities that they
much prefer, such as being with their friends or families, as well as on activities that may
be socially beneficial, such as learning about and involving themselves in politics. The
loss of free time associated with the rat race is an important harm that does justify
intervention on their behalf. Similarly, I believe that intervention is justifiable in Two
villages if the cost of using boats to cross the river is sufficiently great.
Summing things up, we can formulate the following preliminary principle: Victims of
collective action problems like the rat race have a claim to intervention on their behalf if
a Pareto-improving shift is available and the costs of intervention are strongly out-
weighed by its benefits.
By ‘intervention’, I mean a policy that changes the pay-off structure of a decision
situation of a group so that it becomes advantageous for each individual to act in a way
that is consistent with the collective interest of the group. In the case of the rat race, an
intervention is a policy that makes it easier or less costly for each individual to abstain
from participating in the rat race, and so work in accordance with her working time
preferences. We can contemplate a number of specific policies that potentially fulfil
these criteria. Consider, for example, the proposal to strengthen labour unions. Unions
can provide a platform for overcoming collective action problems like the rat race by
facilitating communication, issuing and enforcing collectively binding rules of action
and exerting power to force employers into acceptance of and compliance with work-
ing time regulations. Indeed, unions have historically been the single most important
factor in reducing working time and regulating the workplace, and today many unions
endorse proposals of working time reduction such as the 4-day working week (Penca-
vel, 2018: Ch. 2).
A different way to increase workers’ bargaining power is to equip them with a basic
income. It is often argued that a basic income would make it less costly for individuals to
express their authentic preferences for leisure and working time because it provides them
with a reliable exit option from work contracts that do not suit their interests (van Parijs
and Vanderborght, 2019). Although there is substantial uncertainty about the question
what the likely effects of the introduction of a basic income would be, it can be expected
that most forms of the basic income – if pitched at a reasonably high level – will lead to
an increase in workers’ bargaining power. This is mainly because it equips them with the
freedom to quit unpleasant jobs. Insofar as it decreases the severity of the threat of
unemployment, it mitigates or removes rat races triggered by the desire to avoid dis-
missals or other disadvantages. It is less clear whether a basic income would address rat
races that evolve around other competitive goals such as competitive consumption or
achieving a promotion.
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Rat races can also be tackled more directly through the issuing of maximum work
hours laws. Such restrictions seem like a natural response to the rat race because they
make it impossible for workers to use working time as a means of competing with each
other. Their main advantage is that they are relatively cheap and effective and policy
makers can draw on substantial historical experience with regard to their implementa-
tion. A major drawback of this strategy is that it is a relatively blunt instrument that is
likely to treat alike different workers in different sectors and with different preferences.
This is problematic because rat races in different sectors differ in how severe they are and
should therefore be addressed in different ways. The main advantage of simplicity gets
undermined the more policy makers attempt to fine-tune and tailor maximum hours laws
to specific circumstances.
Regulation is almost never Pareto-improving
I now address an important objection that denies the assumption that the removing of rat
races constitutes a Pareto-improving shift. Let us call workers who prefer to work less and
enjoy more leisure, grasshoppers, and workers who prefer to work more and enjoy less
leisure, ants.8 While interventions to remove the rat race will benefit grasshoppers, they
will harm ants. This means that removing the rat race is not a Pareto-improving shift.
To illustrate this concern, let’s go back to Two villages. The objection begins with the
insight that the example of Two villages is too simplistic in the following way: In reality,
not all villagers will have an interest in the construction of a bridge. Some will be
indifferent and some will be opposed to such a project. For some residents, the expected
benefit of the bridge does not outweigh the cost they would have to bear. Others may
even consider the bridge a disutility, say because it ruins a beautiful landscape. As a
result, the construction of a bridge is no longer justifiable on the grounds that it advances
everyone’s interest. A similar objection applies against the grasshoppers’ demand to
remove the rat race. Helping grasshoppers by regulating labour markets harms the
interests of ants because the introduction of a regulatory mechanism makes it more
difficult or more costly for them to work as long as they please. If this were the case,
interventions would in fact not be Pareto-improving because they improve the situation
of grasshoppers at the expense of the interests of ants.
There are two ways in which defenders of working time reduction policies can
respond to this objection. First, they can point out that not all forms of intervention harm
ants. While coercive policies such as maximum work hours laws may well harm ants, a
number of other interventions may not, such as, for example, non-coercive measures that
use incentives and voluntary opt-in programmes. An illustrative example of a non-
coercive policy is the ‘Right to Disconnect’ introduced on 1 January 2017 in France,
which requires firms with more than 50 employees to propose time frames during which
workers are not required to be online and to respond to emails (Boring, 2017). The
French government introduced this right as a response to widespread overwork and a
rising prevalence of burnout syndrome. In contrast with maximum work hours legisla-
tion, this policy imposes relatively little harm on ants because it strengthens workers’
ability to not work overtime without preventing them from doing so. However, while it
may take the sting out of some rat races, the right to disconnect will not remove them
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entirely because it will be possible and advantageous for workers in many situations to
compete against each other by working extra hours. Crucially, the right to disconnect
does not provide workers with a means of coordinating their actions in order to align
their collective interest with what is individually rational for each worker. Something
similar will likely be true for other non-coercive policies besides protecting the right to
disconnect.9
For example, states can create mechanisms that allow for an opting-out of established
working time directives when certain conditions are met (Bogg et al., 2016: Ch. 12).
States can also take measures to augment workers’ individual or collective bargaining
power, for example, by providing everyone with a basic income or by implementing
state-supported sectoral bargaining systems. Such policies are preferable to coercive
maximum hours laws because they are less restrictive of ants’ freedom to work as long
as they please. Nevertheless, we must assume that these rat race-removing policies too
will normally harm ants, at least to some extent, and so this first response to the objection
is not enough.
This leads us to a second response to the objection which posits that interventions are
justifiable even if they are not, strictly speaking, Pareto-improving. Philosophers have
dedicated much thought to the question of how to evaluate policies that benefit some and
harm others, and there are different approaches to this question. However, reasonable
approaches converge on the idea that if the affected interests of those who would be
benefitted and those who would be harmed are identical or similar in strength, we should
aggregate these interests across individuals and settle the decision in favour of the group
who experiences the largest loss. One particularly appealing approach is the contractu-
alist ‘Complaint Model’. In the subsequent paragraphs, I use the Complaint Model in
order to adjudicate between the competing interests of ants and grasshoppers once we’ve
dropped the assumption that regulating the rat race is beneficial to everyone. I’m not
suggesting that the Complaint Model is the only theoretical approach that provides a
satisfactory solution to the problem of grasshoppers’ and ants’ competing interests. Here
I’m using it merely as an illustration for how one can sustain the argument that regulation
to remove the rat race can be justifiable even though it harms ants to some extent.
According to the Complaint Model, we should endorse a policy if the strongest com-
plaint against it is smaller than the strongest complaint that can be raised against alternative
policies (Scanlon, 2000: 230). To illustrate, if we must choose between either saving one
person from death or a million persons from headaches, the Complaint Model plausibly
recommends saving one person from death. Other doctrines, such as utilitarianism, that
rely on a straightforward aggregation of harms and benefits might implausibly recommend
saving a large number of persons from headaches. In the case of the rat race, the Complaint
Model recommends regulation if the complaint against the rat race that can be raised by the
most adversely affected grasshoppers is stronger than the complaint that can be raised by
those ants that are most adversely affected by regulation.10
It’s likely that the complaint that can be mounted against the rat race by any individ-
ual grasshopper is similarly weighty or weightier than the complaint that arises for any
individual ant as a result of regulation. The most significant harm suffered by ants as a
result of regulation is a loss of financial income. Many types of collectively binding
regulation to prevent the rat race from occurring will effectively prevent ants from
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spending as much time at the workplace as they please and, as a result of that, prevent
them from increasing their income through overtime work.11 On the side of grasshop-
pers, the rat race sets back an interest in free time, which – like money – is an important
resource that can be used to pursue a wide variety of ends (Rose, 2014). Moreover, an
ample literature documents that long work hours have deleterious effects on workers’
safety and health (Wong et al., 2019). If it were true that the loss of free time, taken
together with the risks and health effects of long work hours, harms individual grass-
hoppers more severely than the loss of income harms individual ants, the Complaint
Model would recommend regulating the rat race.
This simple ‘minimize the largest complaint’ principle can generate implausible
consequences in some cases. For example, if we have to choose between saving one
person from losing three fingers and saving 1000 persons from losing two fingers, the
simple version of the Complaint Model counter-intuitively recommends saving one
person from losing three fingers. However, the Complaint Model can be modified in
ways that avoid this troubling implication. For example, a sophisticated version of the
Complaint Model can allow for the aggregation of individual complaints in cases where
complaints are similarly severe. Arguably, the complaint that arises from a loss of two
fingers and the complaint that arises from a loss of three fingers are sufficiently similar to
trigger a concern for the number of individuals who are affected by these losses. I will
assume that this is the most plausible version of the Complaint Model.12 In order to see
how this version of the Complaint Model applies to the rat race, consider the following
example:
10 hours reduction: Imagine an economic sector where the rat race leads to an increase
in average working time from 40 hours to 50 hours per week. A government
responds to this with an intervention – say a strengthening of labour unions – that
removes the rat race and leads to a 10-hours working time reduction.
Let’s assume for a moment that the complaint that arises for ants as a result of
regulation and the complaint that arises for grasshoppers as a result of the rat race are
similarly severe, so that the Complaint Model requires their aggregation (I will later
defend this assumption). If this is true, the Complaint Model would recommend regulat-
ing the rat race if grasshoppers outnumber ants. Plausibly this is the case in most
contemporary societies. Consider the example of the UK. Statistics about overemploy-
ment and underemployment can be used as a very rough indicator for the distribution of
working time preferences and thus for the distribution of grasshoppers and ants. In the
UK, about 32 million individuals are employed in the labour market. Of these, more than
3 million want more hours, 10 million want fewer hours and the rest wants neither more
nor fewer hours. Of those who want fewer hours, more than 3 million would want them
even if this means lower pay and 6.5 million want fewer hours but not with less pay (UK
Office for National Statistics, 2019). This suggests that there are roughly three times
more grasshoppers than ants.13
However, not everyone agrees that such statistics reveal conclusive information about
working time preferences. This is because of a purported process of adaptive preference
formation where individuals in work-centred societies are nudged into believing that
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lifestyles centred around gainful employment are particularly valuable: ‘The connection
between identity and occupation is forged from a young age, with children being
prompted by parents and educators to refine their career aspirations and begin cultivating
their employability’ (Frayne, 2005: 14, 15).
The importance of the institution of paid employment for our identity, social recog-
nition and material subsistence, so the argument goes, makes it difficult to form pre-
ferences that are not aligned with the dominant attitudes towards work.14 Moreover, the
advertisement industry constantly creates new desires for consumer products that can
only be afforded through gainful employment. This puts a premium on high working
time, high-income lifestyles and makes it attractive to develop preferences for paid
employment. The upshot of this argument is that the number of ‘real’ ants is likely to
be substantially lower than suggested by the statistics. While this is perhaps correct, it is
entirely unclear what exactly our preferences would look like in an ‘undistorted’, work-
morality-free setting. It is also unclear whether theorists opposed to perfectionist
approaches to social justice have reasons to criticize the above-described process of
preference formation in work-centred societies. Interesting though it is, I will set this
concern to one side.
However, there is still reason to believe that the above figures overstate the number of
ants in the UK. In an economy where everyone received a living wage, these figures
would provide conclusive knowledge about the number of ants in a society. In the real
world, where many do not receive living wages, these statistics are likely to reflect more
than just working time preferences. For example, some may want more hours because
they need more income to survive or because they want social security benefits that are
available through full-time but not through part-time employment. In other words, not
everyone who is overemployed is necessarily an ant. The upshot of this is that under any
reading of the statistics, ants are outnumbered by grasshoppers.
In order to approximate the number of ants and grasshoppers in the UK, we must also
answer the question of how we should interpret the divide between those grasshoppers
who would like to reduce their working time only with full wage compensation and those
who would like to work less even if this means less money. On which side of the equation
of our harm comparison should we register those grasshoppers who are not willing to
take an income loss? It is possible that these workers are not harmed by rat races because
if they were harmed by rat races and if they earn incomes above the living wage, they
would welcome even those types of working time reduction that go along with wage
reductions. But we can nevertheless assume that those grasshoppers are in favour of the
intervention of strengthening labour unions. This is because labour unions typically
advocate both better pay and reduced working time. Hence, in our calculation, we should
count at least all those on the side of grasshoppers who claim to be overemployed and all
those on the side of ants who claim to be underemployed. This means that under the most
conservative estimation (disregarding issues around low wages and adaptive preference
formation), ants are indeed outnumbered by grasshoppers by three times. The upshot of
this is that rat race-removing interventions are recommended by a reasonable version of
the Complaint Model that aggregates whenever the competing interests at stake are
similar.
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Let me now defend the assumption that the harms at stake on the side of grasshoppers
and those at stake on the side of ants are sufficiently similar to justify aggregation. As I
said, the rat race sets back grasshoppers’ interest in free time, and regulation sets back
ants’ interest in additional income. Both free time and money are important resources
that individuals can use to advance their life plans. The question is how one can vindicate
the judgement that these competing interests in money and free time are of comparable
significance without relying on a perfectionist standard of human flourishing. In other
words, can we establish that the harm suffered by grasshoppers under laissez-faire and
the harm suffered by ants under intervention are sufficiently similar to allow for aggre-
gation without making controversial assumptions about human flourishing?
One way to avoid relying on a perfectionist standard is to appeal, instead, to individual
judgements about the relative significance of money and free time. Such individual judge-
ments can be revealed through a ‘willingness-to-pay’ test of the kind that Ronald Dworkin
has proposed (Bou-Habib, 2009; Dworkin, 1986: Ch. 8).15 To see what this involves,
suppose an ant and a grasshopper each earn an annual salary of £40,000 under a regime
of laissez-faire with 40 hours of work per week, and that they can instead earn £35,000
under a regime of intervention with 35 hours per week. We must decide whether to shift
from the regime of laissez-faire to a regime of intervention. Using a willingness-to-pay test
involves asking the ant how much she would be willing to pay to retain the regime of
laissez-faire and the grasshopper howmuch she would be willing to pay to shift to a regime
of intervention. Suppose that the ant would be willing to reduce her salary by £2,500 in
order to retain laissez-faire (that is, so that her salary would shift from £40,000 to £37,500).
Suppose, next, that the grasshopper would be willing to sacrifice £2,500 in order to have
intervention instead of laissez-faire (she would accept a salary of £32,500 in order to have
intervention). On a willingness-to-pay test, the competing interests of this ant and grass-
hopper are equivalent in significance. By contrast, suppose the ant was more extreme in
her judgement, so that she would derive zero value from the extra free time she could have
under intervention and would thus be willing to pay almost £5,000 in order to retain
laissez-faire (almost all of the income she would gain from laissez-faire). In this case,
we should conclude that her interest in laissez-faire is weightier than the grasshopper’s
interest in intervention. This is because the ant would be willing to pay more in order to
retain laissez-faire than the grasshopper would be willing to pay in order to have inter-
vention. Using a willingness-to-pay test of this kind allows us to reach this judgement
about the relative significance of their interests without assuming that the ant or grass-
hopper has the better conception of the good life and is thus anti-perfectionist.
To my knowledge, such a willingness-to-pay test hasn’t been operationalized in the
context of working time regulation. What I offer here is only a sketch of a theoretical
solution to the problem of comparing the goods of money and leisure in a way that is
anti-perfectionist. My hypothesis, that the interests of grasshoppers that would be set
back under laissez-faire and the interests of ants that would be set back under interven-
tion are sufficiently similar in order to permit aggregation, would be confirmed if ants
and grasshoppers would offer similar amounts in a willingness-to-pay test. And as I have
shown above, a reasonable version of the Complaint Model that aggregates similar
complaints would settle the dispute between ants and grasshoppers in favour of the latter
because there are many more grasshoppers than ants.
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Regulation is harmful to third parties
One might worry that regulating the rat race wouldn’t only set back the interests of ants
but also those of other parties affected by the rat race and its regulation. Crucially, in the
absence of regulation, the rat race works to benefit consumers and business owners, for
example, because it leads to an increased production of goods and services. If regulation
to prevent the rat race from occurring was in place, consumers would see an increase in
the prices of goods and services because the additional labour generated by the rat race
works to expand the availability of consumer goods.16 Business owners might also be
harmed by regulation because they would no longer benefit from the (occasionally
gratis) extra work that occurs as a result of the rat race.17 It might seem arbitrary to
focus discussion of the effects of regulation exclusively on the interests of grasshoppers
and ants when there are also other parties whose interests are adversely affected by
regulatory intervention.18 Taking the interests of these other parties into account might
weaken the case for working time regulation because it could reveal that regulation is
more harmful than the initial analysis that is restricted to the interests of grasshoppers
and ants suggests.
However, it is far from obvious that considering additional interests weakens the case
for working time regulation.19 There are two main reasons to assume that the conclusion
of the Complaint Model wouldn’t be altered by considering other affected interests, that
is, beyond the interests of ants and grasshoppers. First, many of these other affected
interests side with the grasshoppers’ complaint against the rat race. For example, chil-
dren would likely benefit from the presence of workers who return from work earlier.
Other family members, dependents, and friends of those who participate in the rat race
might favour regulation because it would allow them to spend more time with these
workers. A reduced production of goods and services might be valuable from a perspec-
tive of ecology and sustainability because it reduces greenhouse gas emissions and
waste. Moreover, insofar as it is true that long work hours have adverse effects on
workers’ health, consumers might benefit from regulation because public expenditure
to treat overwork-related health issues might go down.
Second, the interests of many parties other than ants that are harmed by regulation
aren’t weighty enough to alter the recommendation of the Complaint Model. It is true
that consumers have an interest in cheaper goods, and the rat race reduces the prices of
consumer goods. But the harm suffered by each consumer as a result of slightly higher
prices is not enough to outweigh the harm experienced by grasshoppers when their free
time is significantly reduced by the rat race. Neither can somewhat lower prices of
consumer goods outweigh the other interests I mentioned above, such as the interests
of children to spend more time with their working parents.
What’s more, most people must work in order to be able to consume which means that
they must weigh their interest in cheaper products against their interest in free time.
Another way to put this is to say that there is often identity between the groups of
grasshoppers, ants and consumers. Grasshoppers and ants are not only workers but also
consumers, and consumers are often (though not always) workers. We should assume
that individuals don’t treat their working time and leisure preferences as entirely inde-
pendent from their consumption preferences. The two are intertwined: Supposedly, ants’
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main reason for preferring long work hours is that this affords them more consumer
goods, and grasshoppers know that working little is incompatible with a consumption-
intensive lifestyle. This means that insofar as consumers are grasshoppers, their interests
in cheaper consumer goods are mitigated by their interest in leisure. Those consumers
that are ants also have an interest (though a much smaller one) in free time that reigns in
their desire for cheap consumer goods.
Having said this, it bears emphasizing that there are some rat races whose removal is
impermissible because they generate significant benefits for the least advantaged. To
understand why this might be the case, note that workers whose skills are high in demand
on the labour market often earn high wages, while those whose skills are low in demand
are often badly paid. Many think that some market-induced inequalities of this kind can
be morally objectionable and that this can justify compensation to those whose skills
happen to be low in demand. It is even less controversial that states have a duty to
provide the worst off with at least enough resources to cover basic necessities. One
straightforward way of complying with that duty is to impose progressive taxation on
high-income earners. The revenue created by this taxation can then be redistributed in
ways that benefit the worst off. However, the size of the revenue that can be extracted
from high-income earners depends on the size of these workers’ income. Much more tax
revenue can be extracted from a high-income earner who works 70 hours per week than
from the same person working only 35 hours per week. With this in mind, consider now
the following scenario.
Corporate consultants: A group of corporate consultants is affected by a rat race, as a
result of which they work much longer than they would do otherwise. The con-
sultants are top-earners and their income is taxed at a rate that is compatible with
the demands of social justice. The state solves their collective action problem so
that each consultant works significantly less than before. Consequently, the state
revenue that flows from taxation of their income diminishes.
If states solve the corporate consultants’ rat race, they lose resources that could
otherwise be used to improve the situation of the worst off (Casal, 2017: 379; Parr,
n.d.; Stanczyk, 2018: 71). The worst off are of course those who normally rely most on
tax-funded social services and if the state’s tax base shrinks, they will be the ones who
suffer most from cuts to these services. This suggests that the removal of rat races
between very privileged workers is morally impermissible because it harms the worst
off.
Note that the force of this argument against regulating rat races between privileged
workers depends on the truth of an assumption that sometimes isn’t met in reality. It
assumes that workers whose working time increases as a result of the rat race earn higher
incomes than those who don’t participate in the rat race. But this isn’t always the case.
We can imagine that the corporate consultants from our example attempt to impress their
boss by staying longer in their offices even though they know that these extra hours
won’t be paid. If those who participate in the rat race don’t earn more income as a result
of increasing their working time, then there is no additional tax revenue that can be
extracted from them.
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Nevertheless, we should expect that many rat races between privileged workers create
paid overtime work that can be taxed to benefit the least advantaged. Regulating these rat
races would harm the interests of the least advantaged to an extent that makes regulation
morally impermissible. Another way to say this is that the urgency of the moral concern
about excessive working time diminishes as workers become better off. Any reason
states can have to aid time-pressured top earners will often be outweighed by the more
urgent moral concern that this will set back the interests of those who’re already dis-
advantaged. In cases like corporate consultants, the complaint generated by intervention
is stronger than the complaint generated by laissez-faire. The interest of the least advan-
taged in maintaining the same level of tax-funded social services outweighs the corpo-
rate consultants’ claim to enjoying more free time.
Contrast corporate consultants with a rat race that occurs among disadvantaged
workers. Imagine, for example, a group of gig-economy delivery workers that is affected
by a rat race whereby everyone accepts delivery jobs in their free time in order to avoid
the threat of being dismissed. Imagine also that the state helps these workers overcome
the rat race by subsidizing gig-economy labour unions. In this case, the rat race removal
doesn’t harm the least advantaged but rather improves their situation because it provides
them with access to additional free time.
What follows from this is that states ought not to solve all rat races indiscriminately
but only when this doesn’t set back the interests of the least advantaged. In extreme
cases, where privileged workers generate enormous tax revenue, states might even have
reasons to make it more difficult for these workers to solve their collective action
problems in order to ‘squeeze’ a maximal amount of tax income from them.20
Regulation is ineffective
I conclude by considering the objection that regulating the rat race is an idle exercise
because, instead of removing the rat race, regulation will only shift the problem to
another field, where it then re-emerges. Remember that the rat race occurs when workers
use long work hours as a means of signalling productivity and commitment in order to
achieve, for example, a promotion. Imagine now that states pass legislation that makes it
impossible for employers to make promotion decisions on the grounds that someone
works longer than someone else. Obviously, this legislation will not remove the worker’s
desire to get a promotion. If workers know that they cannot use long work hours as a
means of demonstrating commitment, they may find other ways of competing that are
just as harmful to their interests. For example, they may decide to demonstrate their
commitment by working more intensively. This suggests that regulation to remove the rat
race may be futile because it only moves the problem and leads to the emerging of
another rat race elsewhere.
The force of this objection mainly depends on two factors: (a) How many workers, if
any, will enter a different rat race once the rat race around work hours is removed? and
(b) How harmful is the new rat race as compared to the old one? The answer to these
questions will in turn depend on the question of how difficult or promising it is to enter
into a new rat race, say around the intensity of work.
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Remember that the rat race around the length of the working day occurs relatively
frequently because workers are aware that working time is an easy and inexpensive way
for employers to approximate productivity and commitment. Often (though not always),
it is more difficult and more expensive for employers to measure the intensity of their
employees’ work. This is because measuring work intensity requires information about
both quantity and quality of the products or services produced by each worker. Goods or
services are normally produced collectively by a number of workers which makes it
more difficult to trace the contribution made by each individual. In other words, the
intensity of work is less publicly verifiable than the number of work hours. Workers will
find it attractive to compete by increasing their work intensity only if they expect that
employers register and reward this additional effort. Workers will abstain from entering
into a work-intensity rat race if intensity is not adequately measured or measurable.
It bears mentioning that insofar as workers do participate in work-intensity rat races,
these are particularly burdensome. Staying longer at the workplace can often be done
with comparably little effort, especially when workers decrease their work intensity.
Working more intensely on the other hand is almost always associated with additional
strain. This means that if work-intensity rat races occur they give rise to concern as well.
For the sake of the argument, imagine for a moment that the new rat race around work
intensity is equally or even more harmful than the one around working time. Would this
give us reason to refrain from removing the working time rat race? Or would it rather
give us reason to issue legislation that removes the work intensity rat race as well? If it
were true that the removing of each rat race would always lead to the emergence of a new
and equally harmful rat race, then it would indeed be futile to pass any such legislation.
But it’s implausible to assume that this is the case.
Remember the above example of the educational arms race where parents attempt to
provide their children with comparative advantages, for example, by sending them to
expensive private schools. Imagine that a state decides to address this arms race by
prohibiting private schools. Supposedly parents could now redirect their efforts and
enter into a different arms race, say by providing their children with additional private
lessons in their free time. Does this mean that the prohibition of private schools is futile?
Not necessarily, because we would expect the new arms race around private lessons to be
less expensive and therefore less wasteful.
Something similar is true for the rat race around working hours. We can expect that
workers will not always be able to find new ways of signalling motivation and commit-
ment that have equally harmful effects than the working hours rat race. At some point,
workers may attempt to signal their motivation by smiling when their boss is around or
by walking through the corridors of the firm in an especially energetic way. At this point,
states may well decide that although problematic in some sense, these rat races are not
worth regulating because their effects are not profound enough to justify intrusive and
coercive measures.
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Notes
1. The term ‘underemployment’ describes a situation in which individuals are employed but
perform less work than they would like to do.
2. The outcome may not be worse for all of the competitors because those who enjoy long work
hours may not mind participating in the rat race. Nevertheless, it is accurate to refer to the rat
race as a collective action problem. To see why, consider a classic example of a collective action
problem. A group of fisherpersons fish in the same lake. Each has an incentive to catch as many
fish as she/he can but if everyone fishes too much, the fish will die out. This suggests that
everyone should have an incentive to fish only a sustainable amount. However, realistically,
some fisherpersons may not have an interest in the long-term stability of the fish stock. Some
fisherpersons may soon retire and others may want to take up a different job in the near future.
These individuals would prefer to be able to fish as much as they can. Nevertheless, we can still
refer to this situation as a collective action problem because the interest in a sustainable fish
stock is shared by most individuals. I will argue in the ‘Regulation is almost never Pareto-
improving’ section that most workers have an interest in not participating in the rat race.
3. As well as being anti-perfectionist, this type of justification for reduced working time does not
rely on the assumption that free time is a Rawlsian ‘social primary good’. For discussion of
this view, see Rose (2016).
4. Arguments of this type suggest that long working time is objectionable because it has adverse
effects on workers’ health or because it fosters an unjust gendered division of labour.
5. Economists refer to this as the ‘part-time wage penalty’. See, for example, Manning and
Petrongolo (2008).
6. Note that we can draw a distinction between rat races that increase productivity and rat races
that do not increase productivity. In one version of the rat race, workers work longer hours in
order to demonstrate commitment, and this additional effort does in fact lead to higher
productivity (say in the form of more goods and services produced). In an alternative
scenario, workers pretend to work longer hours in order to achieve the same ends. In this
case, workers spend more time at the workplace without actually increasing productivity.
This latter scenario is additionally troublesome – that is, apart from any complaints it might
raise on the part of workers who wish to work fewer hours – because it introduces an
inefficiency into the economy. I will set aside this scenario and instead focus on the more
difficult case of the productive rat race where workers actually do produce more goods and
services in their over time.
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7. This can cause a number of injustices. One of them has to do with the fact that resources
invested in the arms race generate no real benefits and could instead be invested in different
ways, such as aid for the worst off. Certain restrictions of markets in education are therefore
justified (among other things) because they have the potential to correct for this injustice. For
discussion, see Halliday (2016). There are of course other reasons for being concerned about
the educational arms race. For example, spending on private schools can be opposed on the
grounds that it undermines equality of opportunity.
8. The grasshopper/ant labels go back to an ancient Greek fable by the storyteller Aesop.
9. One might wonder why we should think that the market mechanism itself wouldn’t provide a
solution to the rat race collective action problem. After all, if it were true that many workers
have preferences for fewer hours and if they’re willing to work for lower wages in order to
obtain their preferred working time arrangement, we would expect that some companies
would try to attract these employees by offering jobs that involve fewer work hours. The fact
that we don’t observe these options in the market might suggest that there is, after all, no
demand for jobs with reduced working time. In reply to this, I argue elsewhere that a collective
action around increased working time does not only occur between individual workers but also
between firms. Firms that compete in a market have incentives to use novel technology in
ways that increase production instead of using it to reduce working time. A similar claim has
been put forth by Cohen (1978: Ch. 11).
10. One might wonder what exactly is meant by the term ‘complaint’. As I understand it, the
concept of a complaint within a Scanlonian contractualist framework broadly refers to some-
thing that sets back a person’s interest. A person has a complaint against a principle to regulate
social interaction if that principle sets back her interests.
11. One might worry that regulation also restricts ants’ access to goods other than money that are
also obtainable through work, such as social recognition, self-esteem, and realizing commu-
nity with others. However, these goods are not exclusively available through work. For
example, individuals can gain social recognition and experience a sense of community with
others through joining voluntary societies. Moreover, acquiring these non-monetary goods
arguably does not require that workers be allowed to work as long as they maximally wish but
only enough to meet a certain threshold. For example, a particular job can be a source of self-
esteem even when the worker in question is allowed to pursue it for only 30 rather than
50 hours per week. Recent research suggests that as little as 8 hours per week might be enough
to reap the ‘goods of work’ other than money (Kamera¯de et al., 2019).
12. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain and defend this version of the Complaint Model.
There is ample literature on the question of what role aggregation should play in contractualist
theory (Horton, 2018; Munoz-Darde, 2013; Reibetanz, 1998).
13. We can expect that there are varying shares of ants and grasshoppers in different sectors of the
economy. A more precise analysis, which is beyond the scope of this article, would disag-
gregate these figures and identify the share of ants and grasshoppers in different sectors of the
economy in order to make sector-specific policy recommendations.
14. Some empirical findings seem to vindicate this hypothesis. Consider the example of Sweden:
‘Ironically, the demand for fewer hours is most pronounced in Sweden, where weekly and
annual hours are already low and the government has devoted itself to reducing the conflict
between work and family. It seems that generous social benefits make working fewer hours an
attractive option in Sweden, especially for women with children. In the United States, where
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average work hours are high and work–family conflict is severe, the working population is
split between those who want more hours and those who want fewer’ (Reynolds, 2004: 95).
15. Note that the willingness-to-pay test is always carried out against a backdrop of equal bidding
power. This ensures that it doesn’t produce outcomes that are skewed in favour of rich workers
who use their high income to ‘outspend’ poor workers.
16. As I mentioned above, not all rat races are productive in the sense that they lead to an increased
production of goods and services. We can imagine cases where workers attempt to impress their
boss by staying longer in their office without actually carrying out more work during these extra
hours. The objection I discuss in this section only applies to productive rat races, where com-
petition between workers leads to an increased production of goods and services.
17. This loss suffered by business owners might also be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices.
18. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing me to this concern.
19. One might think that there is a straightforward reply to this objection, according to which the
interests of consumers or business owners wouldn’t be affected by regulation because business
owners could pay for new workers from the decreased wage of existing workers that are
willing to work fewer hours with less compensation. However, this reply assumes that it
would be easy to transfer these small amounts of freed-up time to new employees. This in
turn is not a realistic assumption to make because transaction costs and other frictions that
occur in real existing labour markets (as compared to idealized theoretical models) make it
difficult to realize these time transfers. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my
attention to this consideration.
20. There are several ways in which states can regulate rat races in a discriminatory rather than in
a universal fashion. For example, states can help create or strengthen gig-economy labour
unions and refrain from strengthening unions that represent privileged professions.
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